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INSIDER INTEREST, NOT INDUSTRY 
INFLUENCE: THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 
William Hayes* 
Conceived as a counterweight to public administration of 
monetary policy, the quasi-private Federal Reserve Banks now 
seem an institutional anomaly. The role that private interests 
play in Reserve Bank governance has prompted criticism that 
their anomalous structure renders the Reserve Banks unduly 
insulated and prone to financial industry influence. Yet a 
survey of the practical effect of the Reserve Banks’ unusual 
governance structure demonstrates not a privileging of private 
industry interests, but instead a pattern of elevating Federal 
Reserve System insiders, with potential involvement from 
publicly appointed Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. As a result, this Note argues that conventional fears of 
the consequences of Reserve Bank governance are largely 
unrealized. This pattern of elevating Federal Reserve System 
insiders, however, raises alternate concerns of institutional 
homogeneity. This Note thus advocates for transparency 
reforms aimed at mitigating these concerns—reforms that 
address not a problem of industry influence in Reserve Bank 
governance, but one of Federal Reserve System insularity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2017, William Dudley, then President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “New York Fed”), 
announced his retirement.1 Shortly thereafter, the board of 
directors of the New York Fed—nine citizens representing 
private and public interests from the Second Federal Reserve 
District, a region encompassing the entirety of New York, 
 
1 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed President 
Dudley to Retire (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/aboutthefed/2017/oa171106 
[https://perma.cc/FRK8-UA3X]. 
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parts of New Jersey and Connecticut,  the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
and Puerto Rico2—empaneled a search committee empowered 
to solicit comments from “the New York Fed’s constituents” 
and retain firms to aid in the search.3 Less than six months 
later, with one public update from the New York Fed board in 
the interim,4 the board plucked John Williams, President of 
the westernmost Federal Reserve Bank and a “consummate 
central-bank insider,”5 to lead the most important of the 
twelve Federal Reserve Banks. 
Although the current and former Chairs of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System welcomed the 
appointment, public reaction was decidedly more mixed.6 
Commenters decried the selection process as “opaque and 
pretty byzantine”7 and “absolute[ly] opa[que],”8 criticizing the 
search committee for apparently abandoning its earlier 
 
2 What We Do, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/whatwedo.html 
[https://perma.cc/F34E-C3GM]. 
3 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., supra note 1. 
4 Statement from Sara Horowitz & Glenn Hutchins, Presidential 
Search Comm. Co-Chairs, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed 
Presidential Search Update (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/presidential-search-update 
[https://perma.cc/Z8H9-KCPL]. 
5 Nick Timiraos, How the New York Fed, Prizing Diversity, Elevated an 




6 See, e.g., Ben Casselman, New York Fed Names John Williams 
President, Bucking Calls for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/business/economy/new-york-fed-
president-john-williams.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/NB7Y-
4SFY]; Jeanna Smialek et al., New York Fed Names John Williams as its 
Next President, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-03/fed-s-williams-shifts-
to-n-y-as-powell-shapes-policy-troika [https://perma.cc/XAL9-EKWD]. 
7 Casselman, supra note 6. 
8 Jeanna Smialek & Matthew Boesler, N.Y. Fed Search Casts Wide Net 
but May Snare an Insider Instead, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/n-y-fed-search-casts-
wide-net-but-may-snare-an-insider-instead [https://perma.cc/QY69-L4ZC]. 
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promises of a diverse and transparent hiring process in favor 
of installing a member of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome 
Powell’s “inner circle.”9 Legislators took particular exception 
at the appointment, calling for the New York Fed search 
committee to appear before Congress or for the nominee 
himself to appear for a formal confirmation hearing.10  
It was not the first time in recent memory that the New 
York Fed had come under public fire. Four years earlier, New 
York Fed President William Dudley was summoned before the 
Senate’s Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Protection, which took aim at a different perceived 
problem at the Bank: its supervision of banks in the District.11 
After the disclosure of taped conversations among New York 
Fed supervisors regarding the adequacy of Goldman Sachs’ 
internal conflict-of-interest policy,12 the Senate subcommittee 
questioned the New York Fed’s ability and desire to supervise 
important financial institutions headquartered in its District. 
To some, the disclosures reflected a culture of deference by the 
New York Fed to the financial industry—a culture rooted in 
the institutional structure of the New York Fed itself. In one 
illustrative exchange from the hearing—purportedly aimed at 
“Examining and Addressing Regulatory Capture”—one 
senator decried a regulatory “culture in which [the New York 




11 Improving Financial Institution Supervision: Examining and 
Addressing Regulatory Capture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. 
and Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
113th Cong. 2 (2014) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Sherrod 
Brown, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Prot.). 
12 These disclosures ultimately culminated in the firing of the bank 
examiner who released her discussions with bank officials. See Jake 
Bernstein, Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and a Culture Clash, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/carmen-
segarras-secret-recordings-from-inside-new-york-fed 
[https://perma.cc/5URT-T9HY] [hereinafter Inside the New York Fed]; Jake 
Berstein, NY Fed Fired Examiner Who Took on Goldman, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 
10, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/ny-fed-fired-examiner-who-
took-on-goldman [https://perma.cc/4NXC-QNXZ]. 
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serving at the, if not the will, at least with the influence of 
those [the Bank] regulate[s].”13 Indeed, the “opaque and pretty 
byzantine” process by which the New York Fed President 
(along with the other regional Federal Reserve Bank 
Presidents) is selected has, until recently, directly involved 
representatives of the banks that the Federal Reserve is 
charged with supervising. 
Given the previous role of regulated entities in appointing 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, it comes as little surprise 
that the Reserve Banks have been criticized as potentially 
being overly deferential to the banks they regulate.14 
Originally conceived as a check on the potential inflationary 
tendencies of government, the Reserve Banks have come 
under fire for the unusual governance structure that sprung 
from this original conceit.15 This Note examines the unusual 
institutional structure of the Federal Reserve System and its 
quasi-private regional Reserve Banks, and outlines the 
critique that this structure renders the regional Reserve 
Banks both constitutionally suspect and, arguably, practically 
beholden to financial interests.  
 
13 Hearings, supra note 11, at 10 (statement of William C. Dudley, 
President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.). This 
perception was further exacerbated by the New York Fed’s apparent failure 
to implement recommended changes from its own evaluation of the 
regulatory lapses that contributed to the financial crisis. The internal report 
outlined a supervisory culture that was viewed internally as “excessive[ly] 
deferen[tial] to banks,” where “only the most black-and-white issues [were] 
taken forward as concerns” with supervised entities. See FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF N.Y., REPORT ON SYSTEMIC RISK AND BANK SUPERVISION 8–9 (2009) 
(unpublished draft report), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1303305-2009-08-18-frbny-
report-on-systemic-risk-and.html [https://perma.cc/C6SG-6XHR]. See 
Inside the New York Fed, supra note 12, for an account of the purported 
effect of the Beim report at the New York Fed: “Beim handed the report to 
Dudley. The professor [Beim] kept it in draft form to help maintain secrecy 
and because he thought the Fed president might request changes. Instead, 
Dudley thanked him and that was it. Beim never heard from him again 
about the matter, he said.” See also PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 165–67 (2016). 
14 See infra Sections III.C, III.D. 
15 See infra Section III.C. 
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Fears that private interests can exert undue influence on 
the Reserve Banks, however, largely focus on the potential for 
such influence without accounting for the practice of Reserve 
Bank governance.16 In response to the possible drawbacks of 
involving regulated entities in selecting their regulator, both 
Congress and the Reserve Banks have taken steps to mitigate 
perceived or actual financial industry influence within the 
Banks. Furthermore, despite being appointed by a process 
criticized as beholden to the private interests represented on 
Reserve Bank boards, recent Reserve Bank Presidents have 
almost uniformly been Federal Reserve System veterans. 
Although the widespread promotion of Federal Reserve 
insiders to presidential posts assuages concerns of the 
deleterious effects of private interests on Federal Reserve 
governance, it raises alternative issues of institutional 
insularity. As a result, this Note advocates for transparency 
reforms in Reserve Bank governance aimed at increasing 
public accountability and engagement in practice, rather than 
counteracting any theoretical financial industry influence.  
The remainder of this Note is structured as follows: Part II 
outlines the institutional history and the governing statute of 
the Federal Reserve System, as well as the governance 
structure of the Reserve Banks. Part III turns to the role that 
the Reserve Banks play in financial supervision within the 
System, outlining both the prevailing criticisms of Reserve 
Bank supervision and potential responses to those critiques. 
Part IV details the constitutional concerns raised by Reserve 
Bank governance; Part V subsequently examines the actual 
results of the appointment process for Federal Reserve Bank 
Presidents and suggests possible reforms to promote 
transparency and accountability. A brief conclusion follows. 
II. DEVELOPING A PUBLIC-PRIVATE HYBRID: 
THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM 
The historical development of the Federal Reserve System 
over the early twentieth century helps to explain the unusual 
 
16 See infra Section V.A. 
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governance structure of the modern Federal Reserve. The 
current Federal Reserve System consists of the Board of 
Governors, comprised of seven Presidentially appointed 
Governors and located in Washington, and the twelve regional 
Federal Reserve Banks, headed by Presidents and dispersed 
around the country.17 Throughout its development, fears that 
granting both monetary and fiscal policy authority to public 
officials would incentivize financing government debt through 
inflation spurred this two-tiered arrangement, with private 
Reserve Banks operating as a check on these incentives.18  
Although Peter Conti-Brown has offered an account of 
three formative events in the founding of the modern Federal 
Reserve System—the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the 
Banking Act of 1935, and the Federal Reserve-Treasury 
Accord of 195119—this Note will limit its historical 
 
17 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012). The twelve Federal Reserve Banks are 
headquartered in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, 
Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San 
Francisco. Federal Reserve Banks, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (last 
updated Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/federal-reserve-system.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7MJF-7DC5]. No more than one member of the Board of 
Governors can be appointed from any one Reserve Bank district. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 241. 
18 Esther L. George, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Kan. City, Structure, Governance, Representation: Federal Reserve 
Member Banks and Federal Reserve Bank Stock 4–5 (July 2016) (transcript 
available at https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/ 
speeches/2016/structure-governance-representation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QY8N-HBDK]). 
19 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 15–39. The Federal Reserve-
Treasury Accord of 1951 refers to a sentence issued on March 4, 1951, after 
tension between the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate policy and the Truman 
White House. The statement announced that the Treasury Department and 
the Federal Reserve had “reached full accord with respect to debt 
management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their 
common purpose to assure the successful financing of the Government’s 
requirements and, at the same time, to minimize monetization of the public 
debt,” thereby forming the foundation for “the idea that the Fed’s monetary 
policy is institutionally separate from the economic policies of the 
president.” Id. at 35, 37. See also Jessie Romero, Treasury-Fed Accord, FED. 
RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
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examination to the two Acts, which bear most on the Federal 
Reserve System’s structure.  
A. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 
Drafted in the aftermath of a financial crisis in 1907, the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the institutional 
forerunner of the current Federal Reserve System.20 Prior to 
the Act’s enactment, the National Monetary Commission, an 
early attempt to create a new system of monetary policy, spent 
four years investigating international banking structures 
before proposing the National Reserve System.21 The proposed 
National Reserve System would correct some of the “principle 
defects in [the] banking system,” including the lack of “power 
to enforce the adoption of uniform standards with regard to 
capital, reserves, examinations, and the character and 
publicity of reports of all banks in the different sections of the 
country.”22 While four public officials would serve as ex officio 
members, the System would primarily consist of forty-six 
private directors appointed largely by the industry-dominated 
boards of directors of district branches.23  
Although the National Reserve System proposal was 
ultimately abandoned,24 the Commission introduced many 
ideas that would later be repurposed into the Federal Reserve 
System and first articulated the concerns motivating the 
inclusion of private interests into the Federal Reserve’s 




20 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 15–39. 
21 See Uncurrent Events: The National Monetary Commission, 1909-
1912, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (May 2, 2018), 
https://insidefraser.stlouisfed.org/2018/05/national-monetary-commission-
1909-1912/ [https://perma.cc/X8YV-S9S6]. 
22 NAT’L MONETARY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MONETARY 
COMMISSION 6, 9 (1912). 
23 Id. at 12–13. 
24 See Uncurrent Events, supra note 21. 
25 Among other proposals that foreshadowed the coming Federal 
Reserve System, the Commission recommended a fifteen-district structure 
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over the administration of monetary policy to the government, 
the Commission argued that, “[w]hile it may be contended 
that the issue of money of any kind is a distinctive function of 
sovereign power, the exercise of this authority by 
Governments has, as shown by the experience of the world, 
inevitably led to disastrous results.”26 On the other hand, an 
exclusively private institution would deny “the vital interest 
in which the public has in the management of the 
association.”27 To balance these competing concerns, the 
Commission assumed that democratic engagement could 
sufficiently ensure public accountability for the 
predominantly private entity, as the “acts of the directors of 
the branches and of the reserve association [would] be open to 
public inspection and . . . subject to the closest scrutiny by the 
shareholders of the association and the public.”28 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created a system that, 
much like the forerunner National Reserve Association, 
coupled public and private components. Characterized as the 
“Wilsonian Compromise of 1913,”29 the 1913 Act balanced the 
Washington-based Federal Reserve Board, comprised of the 
Treasury Secretary, Comptroller of the Currency, and five 
presidential appointees, with the geographically dispersed 
private Reserve Banks.30 The end result was a system in 
which the Reserve Banks would “function cooperatively but 
independently . . . to achieve the advantages of central 
banking without acquiring the monopoly powers of a single 
 
with branches of the Association in every district, each governed by a board 
of directors of at least 12 members. NAT’L MONETARY COMM’N, supra note 22, 
at 11–12. The twelve members of the board, much like current Federal 
Reserve Bank boards, would be chosen to represent a mixture of purely 
financial and non-financial interests. Id. Ultimately, the National Reserve 
Association sought to not “overshadow[] banks,” but be “their 
representative.” Id. at 15. 
26 Id. at 18. 
27 Id. at 14. 
28 Id. at 39. 
29 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 21. 
30 Id. at 21–22. 
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central bank.”31 As part of this cooperation, Reserve Banks 
were empowered to engage in open market operations.32  
This first stab at monetary policy administration, however, 
emphasized independence over coordination, foregoing the 
advantages of a unified central bank. Instead of a cooperative 
system of authority split between Reserve Banks and the 
Board, the two centers of power sparred over their ambiguous 
policy authority.33 As part of this early split, Reserve Bank 
Governors held regular meetings, known as the Governors 
Conference, to discuss and coordinate open market 
operations—an arrangement alien to the current 
centralization of monetary policy.34  
B. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 
If the financial crisis of 1907 demonstrated the need for a 
federal monetary policy authority, the Great Depression laid 
bare the inadequacies of a system without a central locus of 
authority. In the run-up to the Great Depression, the Board 
and Reserve Banks remained locked in a “continuing struggle” 
over policy matters and their balance of authority.35 Moreover, 
 
31 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE VOLUME I, 
1913–1951 68 (2003). 
32 Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 14, 38 Stat. 251, 264 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012)). 
33 Conti-Brown expands on this point in noting that: 
Because the statute—in the tradition of many great political 
compromises—left room for divergent interpretations for 
competing factions, the legislative authors of the Federal 
Reserve Act never . . . specif[ied] the power relationship 
between and among the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Reserve Banks. In the two places where the Fed exercised 
the most power—the proactive purchase of securities in the 
open market and the reactive discounting of securities 
brought to the doors of the Reserve Banks—rivalries arose 
immediately, both between the board and the banks and 
among the banks themselves. 
CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 23. 
34 See MELTZER, supra note 31, at 77, 81. 
35 Id. at 262; see also id. at 265–66 (“The 1929 recession began with the 
Federal Reserve System divided on personal and substantive issues . . . . 
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the power of the Reserve Banks raised concern that “banker 
interest . . . ha[d] prevailed over the public interest.”36  
Enacted in response to the Great Depression and in the 
midst of broader experimentation during the New Deal, the 
Banking Act of 1933 marked the first step toward establishing 
the contemporary centralization features of the Federal 
Reserve. Importantly, the Act established a formal monetary 
policy body in the Federal Open Market Committee (the 
“FOMC”).37 Although the early FOMC was little more than a 
regular meeting of the twelve Reserve Bank Governors, it 
marked a step towards the formalization of monetary policy 
decision-making.38 While Reserve Banks could refuse to 
conduct open market operations upon advance notice to the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Act began to shift open market 
operations authority from the Reserve Banks to the Board.39  
Two years later, the Banking Act of 1935 marked the end 
of the dysfunctional federalism of the early Federal Reserve 
System. Spearheaded by newly appointed Federal Reserve 
Board Governor Marriner Eccles, the Act cemented the FOMC 
as the sole monetary policy decision-making entity.40 The 
reformulated FOMC would be predominantly comprised of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, with 
Reserve Bank representation decreasing to five Reserve Bank 
Presidents (or First Vice Presidents).41 The result was a 
 
The financial system entered the Great Depression divided, unprepared to 
take decisive action, and uncertain whether policy action was useful or 
desirable to stop economic decline and price deflation.”). 
36 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 27. 
37 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12A, 48 Stat. 162, 168 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2012)). 
38 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 25. 
39 See MELTZER, supra note 31, at 430. 
40 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 29–32. 
41 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 30. Reserve Bank 
representatives on the FOMC are selected from five groups. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York has a permanent seat on the FOMC, one FOMC 
member is selected from the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, 
and Richmond; one from the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland and 
Chicago; another from the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Dallas, and 
St. Louis; and one from the Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis, Kansas 
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Federal Reserve System that retained the institutional 
structure of the original System but whose power had shifted 
toward the center.42 At bottom, the “1935 Act permitted the 
Federal Reserve to become a central bank.”43 
C. The Modern Federal Reserve 
Today, the Federal Reserve System retains this historical 
public-private arrangement. The Board of Governors, located 
in Washington, consists of up to seven members who are 
selected by the President and subject to Senate 
confirmation.44 Governors serve fourteen-year terms and are 
protected by for-cause removal constraints.45 Three members 
of the Board are selected to serve four-year terms as 
Chairman and Vice Chairmen, with one of the two Vice 
 
City, and San Francisco. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2012). The New York Fed’s 
permanent seat on the FOMC was codified in 1942. Pub. L. No. 77-656, § 1, 
56 Stat. 647, 647–48 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2012)). 
42 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 30–31. An abandoned proposal 
aimed at reforming the Federal Reserve System during this period would 
have nationalized the Reserve Banks. Under the proposed 1937 bill, which 
garnered broad support in Congress, all outstanding Reserve Bank stock 
would be purchased. Ultimately, Federal Reserve staff concluded that the 
bill conflated ownership of Reserve Bank stock (a requirement for all private 
member banks) with actual control over the Reserve Banks. MELTZER, supra 
note 31, at 488–89. 
43 MELTZER, supra note 31, at 486. 
44 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012). Senate confirmation of the Chairman and 
Vice Chairmen of the Board of Governors to their particular positions as 
Chairman and Vice Chairmen stands in contrast to the appointment 
procedure for other administrative agency chairs. For example, the 
President designates the Federal Trade Commission Chairman, selected 
from its five Commissioners, without Senate approval. 15 U.S.C. § 41 
(2012). 
45 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). Although the Federal Reserve Chairman and 
Vice Chairmen enjoy for-cause removal protection for their role as 
Governors, they are not explicitly protected from being demoted by the 
President from their position as Chairman or Vice Chairmen. See Adrian 
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1175–79 (2013). Regardless of the lack of statutory protection against at-
will demotion, however, norms against political interference with the 
Federal Reserve constrain the actions of political officials. Id. at 1196–99. 
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Chairmen serving, after the passing of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank 
Act”) in 2010, as Vice Chairman for Supervision.46 Currently 
staffed by former Treasury official and investor Randal 
Quarles, the Vice Chairman for Supervision is tasked with 
“develop[ing] policy recommendations for the Board regarding 
supervision and regulation of depository institution holding 
companies and other financial firms supervised by the Board, 
and . . . oversee[ing] the supervision and regulation of such 
firms.”47  
In contrast to the publicly appointed Board of Governors, 
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks are structured as quasi-
private entities.48 Reserve Banks issue stock to regulated 
member banks, who must purchase stock as a condition of 
membership in the Federal Reserve System.49 Although 
member banks thus hold stock in the Reserve Banks, they do 
not quite “function as the Reserve Banks’ private 
stockholders.”50 Ownership of Federal Reserve stock does not 
afford traditional ownership interests to member banks, as 
Reserve Bank stock retains a constant $100 par value and 
cannot be transferred or pledged.51  
The Reserve Banks’ governance structures similarly bear 
some of the trappings of a private entity. Although the 
Presidents are the public face of the Reserve Banks, the Banks 
operate, by statute, “under the supervision and control of a 
board of directors.”52 Each board of directors is comprised of 
nine members from the Federal Reserve District, categorized 
into three classes, with each class representing distinct 
 
46 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1108(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
242 (2012)). 
47 Id. 
48 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 105 (“If [the Federal Reserve 
Banks] are not private corporations, neither are they purely government 
agencies.”). 
49 12 U.S.C. § 222 (2012). 
50 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 105. 
51 12 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). 
52 Id. § 301. 
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interests. Class A and Class B directors, who constitute two-
thirds of the board seats, are selected by regulated member 
banks.53 Class A directors are directly “representative of the 
stockholding banks” and financial interests, and can be bank 
officers, directors, or employees.54 Class B directors are 
similarly chosen by stockholding member banks, but cannot 
be employees of member banks and are selected to “represent 
the public” rather than banking interests.55 Finally, Class C 
directors, who occupy the remaining three seats on the board 
of directors, are similarly elected to “represent the public,” but 
are appointed by the Board of Governors rather than 
stockholding banks.56  
As part of “the duties usually appertaining to the office of 
directors of banking associations,”57 Reserve Bank boards of 
 
53 Id. § 304. The voting process begins with the solicitation of nominees 
from three groups of member banks within the district, categorized 
according to their capitalization. Each group can nominate one Class A 
candidate and one Class B candidate. Id. For the most recent New York Fed 
board election of Class A and B directors, the three groups were banks with 
capital and surplus of more than $2 billion, banks with capital and surplus 
of $40 million to $2 billion, and banks with capital and surplus of less than 
$40 million. Letter from the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. to Member Banks of 
the Second Fed. Reserve Dist. (October 2, 2018) (available at 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/banking/circulars/class1n
omination-1018.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5KX-T2C9]). 
54 12 U.S.C. §§ 302–303 (2012). For example, the current Class A 
directors of the New York Fed are the Chairman and CEO of Morgan 
Stanley, the Chairman of Valley National Bank, and the President and CEO 
of Solvay Bank. Board of Directors, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/org_nydirectors.html 
[https://perma.cc/PP8J-U3GY]. 
55 12 U.S.C. §§ 302–303. The public interests represented include 
“agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers.” Id. § 302. 
The current Class B directors of the New York Fed are the Chairman and 
Co-Founder of two private equity funds, the CEO of Infor, a cloud computing 
company, and the President and CEO of Nasdaq. Board of Directors, supra 
note 54. 
56 12 U.S.C. § 302. The Class C directors of the New York Fed are a 
union executive officer, a community investment corporation, and a low-
income health and housing services provider. Board of Directors, supra note 
54. 
57 12 U.S.C. § 301. 
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directors select the Presidents and First Vice Presidents of the 
Reserve Banks to five-year terms.58 Until the passing of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the entire nine-member board selected the 
President.59 Currently, however, only the representatives of 
public interests in the Districts, Class B and C directors, play 
a role in the appointment of a Reserve Bank’s President.60 To 
further safeguard against the potential conflicts arising from 
representatives of supervised entities appointing Reserve 
Bank staff, Reserve Bank-specific bylaws prevent directors 
affiliated with thrift institutions from selecting the Bank  
Presidents.61 After the  boards of directors make an initial 
candidate selection, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System renders the ultimate decision on the choice.62 
In addition to their power to select the Reserve Bank 
Presidents, boards of directors are also empowered to fire 
their Presidents without cause.63 Due to their authority to 
both select and remove the Reserve Bank Presidents, the 
powers of the boards of directors have engendered serious 
constitutional and practical concerns about the Federal 
Reserve System’s governance structure.64 
Along with their authority to select and remove the 
Presidents of the Reserve Banks, the Reserve Banks’ boards 
of directors play a number of other formal and informal 
governance roles. True to their corporate form, Reserve Bank 
directors nominally oversee Reserve Bank operations and 
 
58 Id. § 341. 
59 The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the role of Class A directors in 
selecting Reserve Bank Presidents. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1107, 124 
Stat. 1376, 2126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2012)). 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., BYLAWS, art. I § 5 (2018); FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF CHI., BYLAWS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 
art. IX § 1 (2016). 
62 12 U.S.C. § 341. 
63 Id. 
64 See infra Section IV.A. By contrast, the other responsibilities of 
Reserve Bank boards of directors raise fewer practical concerns. See CONTI-
BROWN, supra note 13, at 105. 
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adopt bylaws regulating Reserve Bank business.65 Notably, all 
twelve Reserve Banks have voluntarily limited the 
involvement of Class A and B directors in their financial 
supervisory activities, adopting express provisions in their 
governing bylaws aimed at “minimiz[ing] the risk of an actual 
or perceived conflict of interest at the board level.”66 In 
addition, the Federal Reserve Banks’ boards of directors 
establish their own discount rate—the interest rate on 
Federal Reserve loans they issue—through at least a biweekly 
vote, although the final rate is reviewed and determined by 
the Board of Governors and is uniform across the Federal 
Reserve System.67 Finally, the boards of directors serve an 
 
65 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 105. As part of their governance 
responsibilities, the regional boards of directors have established subject-
matter specific committees. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., BYLAWS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON art. II § 3-6 (2017) (Audit Committee, 
Business Commitments and Performance Committee, Research and 
Regional Outreach Committee, Nominating and Governance Committee); 
Board of Directors, supra note 54 (Nominating and Corporate Governance 
Committee, Audit and Risk Committee, Management and Budget 
Committee). Boards also oversee internal audits. See id. 
66 Board of Directors, supra note 54. See also FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
DALLAS, BYLAWS art. IV § 1 (2016); FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY, 
BYLAWS art. I § 1 (2017); FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., BYLAWS art. I § 5 
(2018); FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., BYLAWS art. III § 1 (2017); FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, BYLAWS art. I § 1(c) (2018); FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF ATLANTA, BY-LAWS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA art. II § 1 
(2017); FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., BYLAWS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF BOSTON art. I § 2 (2017); FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., BYLAWS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO art. I § 2 (2016); FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
CLEVELAND, BYLAWS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND art. I § 5 
(2017); FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, BYLAWS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS art. II § 3 (2018); FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
S.F., BYLAWS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO art. I § 2 
(2012); FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, BYLAWS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS art. I § 4 (2013). 
67 12 U.S.C. § 357; Policy Tools: The Discount Rate, BOARD GOVERNORS 
FED. RES. SYS. (last updated Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R77N-G5Y6]. 
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informal role in informing the Reserve Bank staff of the 
economic conditions of their districts.68  
The Federal Reserve System thus couples the Board of 
Governors, comprised of seven publicly appointed officials, 
with the twelve somewhat private, somewhat public Reserve 
Banks. Although, as outlined above, the early failures of the 
Federal Reserve System spurred a centralization of 
institutional power, the Reserve Banks and the Board of 
Governors still share some overlapping authority. Five 
Reserve Bank Presidents serve on the FOMC, with the New 
York Fed President occupying a permanent role.69 Each 
FOMC member, Governor and President alike, has an equally 
weighted vote on monetary policy decisions.70  
In addition, the Board of Governors may delegate “any of 
its functions, other than those relating to rulemaking or . . . 
the establishment of policies for the supervision and 
regulation of depository institution holding companies and 
other financial firms” to the Reserve Banks.71 In turn, the 
Board of Governors can review any actions taken under this 
delegated authority, and “exercise[s] general supervision over 
. . . Federal reserve banks.”72 Finally, in addition to the 
general supervisory power the Board of Governors exercises 
 
68 See, e.g., Board of Directors, supra note 54 (“The roles of Reserve 
Bank directors” include “acting as a ‘link’ between the government and the 
private sector[,]” and “bring[ing] to the Federal Reserve System the greatest 
benefits of regional autonomy: a diversity of viewpoints on economic and 
credit conditions.”); Our District: Governance, FED. RES. BANK S.F. 
https://www.frbsf.org/our-district/governance/boards-directors/ 
[https://perma.cc/SUJ8-78QA] (“The roles of Reserve Bank directors” 
include “acting as a ‘link’ between the government and the private sector” 
and “bring[ing] to the Federal Reserve System the greatest benefits of 
regional autonomy: separate and eclectic viewpoints on economic and credit 
conditions.”). 
69 12 U.S.C. § 263(a). Reserve Banks may also be represented on the 
FOMC by First Vice Presidents. Id. 
70 Id.; see also Structure of the Federal Reserve System: Federal Open 
Market Committee, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-open-
market-committee.htm [https://perma.cc/4H2F-V7BS]. 
71 12 U.S.C. § 248(k). 
72 Id. § 248(j). 
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over the Reserve Banks, the Board of Governors can also 
remove Reserve Bank officers or directors, including Reserve 
Bank Presidents, for cause.73  
So stands the general balance of power in the Federal 
Reserve System and the governance structures of the Reserve 
Banks and the Board of Governors. The particular role that 
the Reserve Banks play in financial supervision, and the 
problems associated with their supervisory role, is examined 
in Part III. 
III. THE RESERVE BANKS AND FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION 
As previously mentioned, the Federal Reserve Act enables 
the Board of Governors to delegate “any of its functions” to the 
Reserve Banks, save its rulemaking power and its authority 
to establish supervisory and regulatory policies for regulated 
financial institutions.74 The Board of Governors has delegated 
its immediate supervisory authority of financial institutions 
to the Reserve Banks, “rely[ing] largely on the supervisory 
staff of the Reserve Banks to be . . . the ‘eyes and ears’ of the 
Federal Reserve Board’s supervisory staff.”75 Acting as the 
“eyes and ears,” the Reserve Banks can issue informal 
enforcement actions against supervised banks as part of their 
day-to-day monitoring.76 It is this responsibility that has 
 
73 Id. § 248(f) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
shall be authorized and empowered . . . [t]o suspend or remove any officer 
or director of any Federal reserve bank, the cause of such removal to be 
forthwith communicated in writing . . . .”). The communication provision is 
similar to other language establishing for-cause removal protections. See 
Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 
YALE J. REG. 257, 302 (2015). The conflicting standards for the removal of 
Presidents—removable at will by their boards of directors but only 
removable for cause by the Board of Governors—potentially gives the 
Reserve Bank Presidents “two masters,” with different standards for 
removal by each. Id. 
74 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
75 Thomas H. Stanton, Bank Supervision: Unfinished Business from the 
Financial Crisis, in 33 BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY REPORT 1, 4 
(2014). 
76 See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
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generated concern about the connection between the Reserve 
Banks’ governance regime and the potential influence of 
private interests in financial supervision.   
A. Reserve Bank Supervision in Practice  
The architecture of financial regulation is characterized by 
overlapping grants of authority between federal regulators, 
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the 
“OCC”), an independent division organized within the 
Department of the Treasury; the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (the “FDIC”); and the Federal Reserve sharing 
responsibility for the regulation of depository institutions.77 
Generally, the Federal Reserve acts as the primary supervisor 
for bank holding companies and state banks that are members 
of the Federal Reserve System, while the OCC has primary 
authority over national banks and savings associations.78 
Although the FDIC maintains primary supervisory 
responsibility over state nonmember banks, it also retains 
authority to supervise any institution with deposit insurance. 
As a result, the FDIC has overlapping backup authority to 
examine bank holding companies and financial companies 
supervised by the Federal Reserve.79 The bulk of the Federal 
Reserve’s remaining supervised entities consist of state 
member banks, savings and loan holding companies, financial 
holding companies, and foreign banks.80  
 
77 See Eric J. Pan, Organizing Regional Systems: The US Example, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 188, 198–203 (Niamh 
Moloney et al. eds., 2015). 
78 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Supervising and 
Regulating Financial Institutions and Activities, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 72, 74–77 (2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K3YH-36AR]. The Federal Reserve also oversees a 
number of other financial entities, including foreign banking organizations, 
systemically important financial institutions, and savings and loan holding 
companies. Id. at 74–80. 
79 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
80 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 78, 
at 74–80. 
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The Federal Reserve’s authority to supervise bank holding 
companies on a consolidated basis, derived from Section 5 of 
the Bank Holding Company Act,81 vests significant 
supervisory authority over the largest financial companies in 
the Federal Reserve System. As part of this authority, Reserve 
Banks exercise front-line supervision over bank holding 
companies located within their District.82 At the Reserve 
Banks, prudential supervision of the largest bank holding 
companies is informal and continuous.83 Reserve Bank staff 
can be dedicated to supervising particular financial 
institutions or to monitoring certain types of financial risk,84 
and largely engage in ongoing supervision rather than the 
historical practice of regular, annual examinations.85 Such 
continuous monitoring includes meeting with bank 
management, reviewing internal firm data, and evaluating 
firms along several metrics, including capital, asset quality, 
and management.86 To guard against assimilation into the 
 
81 See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 729, SUPERVISING 
LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: WHAT DO SUPERVISORS DO? 3 
(2015), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr7
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF2Z-V6FR]; see also CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, 
at 160–61. 
82 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 81, at 7. 
83 See id. at 10–13. Although the New York Fed’s supervisory practices 
for large bank holding companies is likely not applicable across all Federal 
Reserve Banks, it accounts for the supervision of most the largest financial 
institutions, including JP Morgan Chase, the Goldman Sachs Group, 
Citigroup, and the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Id. at 11 n.9. Of 
the twelve firms currently in the Large Institution Supervision 
Coordinating Committee portfolio, which represent the “largest, most 
systemically important financial institutions in the United States,” nine are 
located in the Second Federal Reserve District and are supervised by the 
New York Fed. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 81, at 11; Large 
Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. 
RES. SYS., (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/large-institution-
supervision.htm [https://perma.cc/T9TX-BG7F]. 
84 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 81, at 11. 
85 Id. at 22–23. 
86 FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., SUPERVISION, REGULATION, AND 
CREDIT ENFORCEMENT UNIT PURPOSE AND PRACTICES 8–9 (2007), 
8_2019.3_HAYES (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/2020  4:04 PM 
No. 3:1123] INSIDER INTEREST, NOT INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 1143 
culture of the regulated entity (the problem of “regulatory 
capture”), supervisory staff regularly rotate between 
institutions.87 
To correct deficiencies at financial institutions, the Federal 
Reserve issues informal and formal enforcement actions. 
Reserve Banks only have authority to issue informal 
enforcement actions—corrective actions voluntarily 
implemented by banks that range in severity from supervisory 
letters (the least severe informal action) to memoranda of 
understanding (the most severe).88 Formal enforcement 
actions, by contrast, can only be undertaken by the Board of 
Governors, and address more significant institutional 
failures, including insufficient responses to informal actions 
or violations of laws or regulations.89 Recent informal 
enforcement actions for large, important financial institutions 
taken by the New York Fed overwhelmingly involved matters 
requiring attention or matters requiring immediate attention, 
both of which identify supervisory concerns and require the 
regulated institution to submit corresponding corrective 
plans.90   
B. Reserve Bank Supervision and the Board of 
Governors 
The Reserve Banks, however, do not supervise in a 
vacuum. Their power is constrained by the authority of the 
Board of Governors and the informal nature of enforcement 





87 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 81, at 16. 
88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., supra note 86, at 9–12. 
89 Id. at 12–13. 
90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y,, supra note 81, at 29–30. Matters 
Requiring Attention comprised 1340 of the over 1500 supervisory actions 
issued to large financial institutions by the New York Fed from 2011 to the 
end of 2014. Id. at 29, fig.7. Matters Requiring Immediate Attention, the 
second largest subgroup of informal enforcement actions, comprised fewer 
than 200 of the 1540 actions. Id. 
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Reserve Banks only exercise authority within the broader 
supervisory boundaries established by the Board of 
Governors, which retains the non-delegable responsibility to 
establish supervisory and regulatory policies for Federal 
Reserve-regulated institutions.91  
Moreover, the Federal Reserve System has recently 
trended toward consolidating supervisory and regulatory 
authority with the Board of Governors. Title XI of the Dodd-
Frank Act formally established a Vice Chairman for 
Supervision position on the Board of Governors, a position 
dedicated to financial supervision and regulation. The Dodd-
Frank Act tasks the Vice Chairman with “develop[ing] policy 
recommendations for the Board regarding supervision and 
regulation of depository institution holding companies and 
other financial firms supervised by the Board, and . . . 
oversee[ing] the supervision and regulation of such firms,”92 
thus squarely locating Federal Reserve regulatory 
responsibility in one Governor.93 The Vice Chairman for 
Supervision also publicly spearheads the Federal Reserve’s 
regulatory efforts, including annual stress tests for the largest 
bank holding companies.94  
Additionally, internal changes to the supervisory process 
have apparently stripped supervisory power over the largest 
 
91 12 U.S.C. § 248(k) (2012). 
92 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1108(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
242 (2012)). 
93 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 246–47 (“This is the broadest 
grant of authority to an individual in the Federal Reserve Act—greater than 
even the explicit authority given to the Fed chair.”). The position remained 
unfilled through the Obama administration, although it was effectively 
staffed by Governor Daniel Tarullo. See Binyamin Applebaum, Fed’s 
Proponent for Regulation to Depart, Leaving 3 Vacancies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/us/politics/daniel-tarullo-
federal-reserve.html [https://perma.cc/RFZ9-3U35]. 
94 See, e.g., Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman for Supervision, Bd. Of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., A New Chapter in Stress Testing (Nov. 
9, 2018) (transcript available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/quarles20181109a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3N44-M527]). 
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financial institutions away from the Reserve Banks and 
centralized it with the Board of Governors.95 Thus, as the 
Board of Governors has consolidated regulatory and 
supervisory authority of the Federal Reserve System and 
diminished the authority of the Reserve Banks, it now 
maintains the core neurological functions of regulation and 
supervision, even if the Reserve Banks continue to act as the 
“eyes and ears” of the System.  
C. The Problem of Financial Supervision by the 
Reserve Banks 
In spite of the Reserve Banks’ subordinate relationship 
with the Board, the representation of financial interests in the 
governance structure of the Reserve Banks continues to raise 
concern about the role of Reserve Banks in financial 
supervision.96 For example, in the fallout from the financial 
crisis, legislators initially sought to eliminate the role of the 
boards of directors in selecting some Reserve Bank 
Presidents. Ultimately, however, Congress settled on merely 
reducing the role that financial interests play in the process 
rather than eliminating it altogether.97 Yet high-profile 
regulatory controversies have continued to recur, including 
the aforementioned outcry aimed at the New York Fed, as well 
as the substantial trading losses incurred at JPMorgan 
 
95 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 168 (“In 2010, however, it 
appears that the Board of Governors has worked to move the Reserve Banks 
increasingly out of the business of supervising the largest banks in the 
financial system.”). 
96 See id. at 167 (“In the geography of Fed power, the complexities and 
proximities of bank supervision give private banks greater control over Fed 
policy than the rest of the general public.”). 
97 Initial proposals in the Dodd-Frank Act included making the New 
York Fed President a Presidential appointee, subject to Senate 
confirmation. See Sewall Chan, Reform Bill Adds Layers of Oversight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/business/16regulate.html 
[https://perma.cc/K56N-VELB]. Ultimately, however, the Act settled with 
eliminating the role of Class A directors in the selection process. See Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1107, 124 Stat. 1376, 2126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 341 
(2012)). 
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Chase, which occurred while JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie 
Dimon sat on the New York Fed board.98 
Notwithstanding the control that the Board of Governors 
exercises over the quasi-private Reserve Banks, the unease 
behind Reserve Bank governance is understandable. The 
appointment process for Reserve Bank Presidents vests 
private citizens (including, until recently, those directly 
representing regulated entities) with the power to select 
Reserve Bank Presidents,99 providing fodder for the criticism 
that the Presidents are “essentially hired and serving at . . . if 
not the will, at least with the influence of those [they] 
regulate.”100 Even after Dodd-Frank eliminated the role of 
Class A directors in selecting Reserve Bank Presidents, the 
continued authority of Class B directors (who are similarly 
selected by financial institutions) and other private citizens in 
the appointment process has left concerns about potential 
industry capture unresolved.101 Moreover, the potential 
influence of banks in the appointment process is exacerbated 
by the unique arrangement of the Federal Reserve Banks, in 
which regulated banks are Reserve Bank stockholders. Such 
an arrangement leaves the Federal Reserve Banks prone to 
criticism that their institutional arrangement encourages 
 
98 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text; William Alden, 
Dimon Leaves New York Fed Board as His Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 
2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/dimon-leaves-new-york-
fed-board-as-his-term-ends/ [https://perma.cc/R9MC-CV78] (“There is an 
undeniable perception problem . . . It is damaging the legitimacy of the 
Federal Reserve.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
99 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 256 (“[T]he basic problem of 
appointment at the Reserve Banks is the dramatically disproportionate 
influence that regulated banks have on the people who become their 
overseers. From the perspective of democratic accountability, banker 
influence at the appointment threshold is the real issue.”). 
100 Hearings, supra note 11, at 10 (statement of William C. Dudley, 
President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.). 
101 See, e.g., id. at 11 (“Your Class B directors are essentially chosen by 
the banks, and that is not lost on anyone.”). 
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greater proximity between the regulator and regulated, to the 
detriment of effective financial regulation.102  
More fundamentally, the insulation of the Federal Reserve 
Bank Presidents from the political process, while central to 
the Federal Reserve framers’ goal of insulating monetary 
policy from governmental influence, raises accountability 
problems. In other words, discrepancies between the 
regulatory preferences of the Reserve Banks and other 
agencies or Congress may hinder effective coordination of 
financial regulation.103 Furthermore, financial regulation, as 
an arguably “inherently executive function,” could be a 
particularly inappropriate responsibility of the Reserve 
Banks, considering their political insulation and their 
institutional links to regulated member banks.104 Indeed, 
Peter Conti-Brown has argued that Congress’ decision to 
grant expanding supervisory authority to the Federal Reserve 
System is particularly inappropriate given the central bank’s 
political insulation, as only monetary policy, not financial 
regulation more generally, was intended to be free from 
political influence.105  
 
102 See Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared 
Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and 
Financial Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 136 (2015) (“Private 
banks that hold stock in regional Federal Reserve banks largely select the 
regional Feds’ boards of directors . . . . fuel[ing] concerns that financial 
regulators are too easily captured by the entities that they regulate and 
advance those entities’ interests at the expense of the public.”). 
103 See Peter Conti-Brown, The Twelve Federal Reserve Banks: 
Governance and Accountability in the 21st Century 16 (Hutchins Ctr. on 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings, Working Paper No. 10, 2015) 
(“[T]here is evidence that the New York Fed’s views of good bank 
supervisory practices don’t match those in Congress.”). 
104 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 170 (“[B]ank supervision is not 
only an inherently executive function we would want to place within 
inherently executive bureaus . . . [but] the supervisory function is primarily 
lodged in the part of the Federal Reserve System with the greatest and most 
opaque political power: the Federal Reserve Banks.”) 
105 Id. (“There is simply no theory offered that justifies the legal 
insulation of the Fed from a variety of political pressures—for example, in 
the form of complete budgetary autonomy, the structure of the FOMC—for 
bank supervision.”). 
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Although the framers of the Federal Reserve System 
crafted an institutional framework deliberately insulated 
from politics, the Federal Reserve’s regulatory responsibilities 
almost uniformly expanded after its initial creation.106 This 
subsequent coupling of supervisory and monetary policy 
authority arguably does not reflect a careful consideration of 
the political independence of the Federal Reserve but instead 
“reflects path dependency and historical inertia.”107 As a 
result, the vesting of financial supervisory authority in the 
Federal Reserve has combined supervisory and monetary 
policy authority in an institution whose unique governance 
arrangement potentially leaves it prone to industry influence. 
D. Responses to Criticism of Reserve Bank Supervision 
In spite of its structural peculiarities, the Federal 
Reserve’s arrangement of quasi-private regulation does not 
necessarily mean that the Reserve Banks are uniquely 
susceptible to capture. Self-regulation is not uncommon in the 
financial industry, which widely relies on intra-industry 
policing through entities like the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority.108 Indeed, self-regulation may be 
particularly effective in the field, considering the complexities 
of banking and the incentives of market participants to insist 
 
106 Id. at 160–63. 
107 Id. at 170. 
108 Professor Gillian Metzger has commented on this norm in the 
financial services industry, noting that: 
Reliance on private actors is a central and recurring theme 
of financial regulation. Supervisory responsibilities are 
delegated to private self-regulatory organizations, like the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which 
oversees the securities industry . . . The inclusion of 
representatives of private member banks in the Fed’s 
institutional structure is another manifestation of this 
incorporation of private actors into public financial 
regulation. 
Metzger, supra note 102, at 139. 
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on more stringent supervision of industry members.109 Ideally, 
if bank customers bear the costs of misbehavior by financial 
institutions through overpaying for financial products (rather 
than benefiting themselves from such misbehavior), financial 
institutions are incentivized to police the behavior of 
competitors.110 Consequently, the presence of financial 
interests in the governing board of the Reserve Banks may be 
less problematic than it initially appears. Additionally, 
although the issuance of Federal Reserve Bank stock to 
regulated member banks appears to give them a direct 
interest in the Reserve Banks,111 the ownership of stock does 
not necessarily correlate to effective control by the 
stockholding banks.112 Finally, accusations of capture by 
financial interests are not unique to the Federal Reserve, and 
are also levied against more politically accountable 
regulators. The now-defunct Office of Thrift Supervision 
notoriously advertised itself as a “less antagonistic” regulator 
and supervised some of the least-sound institutions prior to 
the financial crisis.113  
More broadly, the combination of supervisory and 
monetary policy authority in the Federal Reserve may not be 
undesirable from either a theoretical or practical perspective. 
Secrecy and political insulation in institutional design is not 
 
109 See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth 
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5, 8–12 (2013) (“[Self-regulation] is the 
seemingly sensible approach to financial regulation . . . . Industry 
professionals have strong incentives to police their own, since many of the 
costs of misbehavior are born by all members of the profession while the 
benefits inure only to the misbehaving few.”); see also SIMON JOHNSON & 
JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 94 (2010) (“Financial policy took on the trappings of 
a branch of engineering, in which only those with hands-on experience on 
the cutting edge of innovation were qualified to comment.”). 
110 See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 109, at 8–11. Such self-
regulation is not only theoretically beneficial, but is also arguably successful 
in practice. See id. at 12 (“Whatever the theoretical limitations upon 
financial self-regulation, no other arena of vital economic activity in this 
country has regulated itself for so long or so comprehensively.”). 
111 See Metzger, supra note 102. 
112 See MELTZER, supra note 42. 
113 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 109, at 96–97. 
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only beneficial in monetary policy, where knowledge of 
undisclosed policy rates could allow for market manipulation, 
but in regulation as well, where disclosure of financial trouble 
at an institution can spur a run on the distressed bank.114 
Additionally, the political accountability of other executive 
branch financial regulators does not necessarily translate into 
greater insulation from financial interests. Indeed, the 
structure of executive branch agencies may provide 
alternative opportunities for regulatory capture, given their 
reliance on fees levied on the institutions they regulate.115 
Accusations of regulatory capture that focus on the 
institutional structure of financial regulators, therefore, are 
not limited to the Federal Reserve, and its lack of 
transparency and political insulation may even have salutary 
effects on financial supervision. 
Nevertheless, the role that private interests play in the 
selection of Reserve Bank Presidents will continue to spark 
criticism that the Reserve Banks are prone to capture by the 
entities they regulate, particularly if high-profile supervisory 
lapses recur. The next section turns to the constitutional 
challenges raised against the Reserve Banks’ governance 
arrangements, before outlining the limitations of the 
argument.  
IV. RESERVE BANKS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN   
The Federal Reserve, among administrative agencies, 
represents the “apogee of independence that is the traditional 
hallmark of financial regulation.”116 It owes its independence 
to a number of features, including the lengthy tenure of its 
 
114 See Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 
YALE J. REG. 825, 826–27 (2014). 
115 Such fees can lead to fee-shopping from banks and a “‘race to the 
bottom,’ in which agencies attract ‘customers’ by offering relatively lax 
regulatory enforcement.” JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 109, at 96. 
116 See Metzger, supra note 102, at 134. 
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Governors,117 its budgetary autonomy,118 the potential  
consequences of untoward political interference,119 and 
broader norms about the desirability of an apolitical central 
banking system.120 One of the most visible ways in which the 
Federal Reserve is insulated from political control, however, 
is through the “opaque and pretty byzantine”121 process by 
which the regional Bank Presidents are selected—a process 
that, as outlined above, leaves the Federal Reserve 
particularly prone to criticisms of financial industry 
capture.122 This appointments process, coupled with the 
removal protections afforded to Reserve Bank Presidents, 
raises concern that the Presidents are unduly insulated under 
constitutional requirements for agency accountability.  
A. The Appointments and Removal Problem with 
Reserve Bank Presidents 
The authority that regional Federal Reserve Banks’ boards 
of directors exercise over the selection and removal of Reserve 
Bank Presidents likely runs afoul of constitutional 
requirements for the appointment and removal of executive 
branch officials. Over a series of canonical administrative law 
decisions, the Supreme Court has delineated the scope of 
permissible restrictions on Presidential authority over 
executive agency officers. Because of the peculiar structure of 
 
117 See 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (“[E]ach member shall hold office for a 
term of fourteen years . . . .”). 
118 See Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 273–86 (“The Federal Reserve is 
the only truly autonomous budgetary entity in the entire federal 
government, including Congress and the President.”). 
119 See Vermeule, supra note 45, at 1198 (“[I]t seems highly plausible 
to think that the political opposition could inflict serious damage on the 
President by charging that Fed independence had been compromised on 
disreputable political grounds.”). 
120 See Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 263 (“[C]entral bank 
independence . . . lashes [] politicians (usually the President) to the mast to 
give society the outcome that everyone would ultimately prefer, but that is 
very hard to achieve . . . .”). 
121 Casselman, supra note 6. 
122 See supra Section III.C. 
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the Federal Reserve—and the formal authority of their boards 
of directors (albeit authority that is circumscribed by 
legislative and internal constraints)—the Federal Reserve 
System has faced sharp constitutional criticism.123 Although, 
as outlined below, the Federal Reserve System’s governance 
almost certainly violates doctrinal requirements for 
administrative agency governance, the practical effect of this 
arrangement has been to elevate internal Federal Reserve 
interests rather than to privilege private entities.   
1. The Scope of Presidential Appointment and 
Removal Authority 
The Appointments Clause of Article II “prescribes the 
exclusive process by which the President may appoint ‘officers 
of the United States.’”124 The Clause contemplates two sorts of 
officers: principal and “inferior.”125 Only the President, with 
Senate advice and consent, can appoint principal officers.126 
By default, inferior officers are appointed through the same 
Senate advice-and-consent process, but can be appointed, as 
Congress provides, by “the President alone,” “the Courts of 
Law,” or “the Heads of Departments.”127 Distinguishing 
between the two turns on whether the officer’s “work is 
directed and supervised . . . by others who were appointed by 
 
123 See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 300–03. 
124 NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 945 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
125 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Members of the executive branch can 
also come in a third variety, “mere employees,” who are “part of the broad 
swath of ‘lesser functionaries’ in the Government’s workforce.” Lucia v. 
SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (internal citation omitted). Although the 
distinction between officers and employees defies easy characterization, see 
id. at 2051–52, courts have placed Reserve Bank Presidents within the 
officer side of that divide, cf. Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 
510, 519–20 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
126 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
127 Id. 
8_2019.3_HAYES (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/2020  4:04 PM 
No. 3:1123] INSIDER INTEREST, NOT INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 1153 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”128  
Such procedural requirements are, according to the 
Supreme Court, “more than a matter of ‘etiquette or protocol,’” 
but instead rank “among the significant structural safeguards 
of the constitutional scheme.”129 The Supreme Court has 
identified at least three interests protected by the two-tiered 
Appointments Clause scheme, largely related to preserving 
the separation of powers and ensuring greater accountability 
for the appointments process: first, it “prevents congressional 
encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches”; 
second, it “assure[s] a higher quality of appointments” as the 
President is “less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and 
personal favoritism”; and, finally, it “ensure[s] public 
accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and 
the rejection of a good one.”130  
In addition to the requirements imposed by the 
Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court has policed removal 
protections of agency officers to safeguard “the President’s 
ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed” and 
promote the “public’s ability to pass judgment on [the 
President’s] efforts[,]” thereby maintaining separation of 
powers values.131 Article II of the Constitution tasks the 
 
128 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). Previously, in 
Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court outlined a more multifaceted 
approach to delineate the divide between principal and inferior officers, 
looking to an officer’s removability by higher-level executive officials, as well 
as limits on the officer’s duties, jurisdiction, and tenure. 487 U.S. 654, 671–
73 (1988). More recently, the Supreme Court has followed Edmond’s 
formulation in determining the distinction between the two. See Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010). 
129 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659. 
130 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659–60. Preventing congressional 
encroachment over presidential appointments while simultaneously 
retaining congressional approval over the President’s appointments, 
however, may be two goals in irreconcilable tension with one another. 
Similarly, the accountability justification for Senate confirmation locates 
much of the responsibility for appointments outside the executive branch, 
envisioning public accountability for both the President and the Senate. 
131 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 498. 
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President with “tak[ing] Care that the laws [are] faithfully 
executed.”132 Over a series of canonical cases, the Supreme 
Court has identified the removal power as integral to this duty 
and to the separation between the legislative and executive 
branches.133 After asserting a broad scope of presidential 
removal authority in Myers v. United States,134 the Supreme 
Court has subsequently permitted some insulation of agency 
officials from at-will removal. For example, in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States,135 the Supreme Court permitted for-
cause removal requirements for officers of independent 
agencies.136 Later, in Morrison v. Olson,137 the Court blessed 
removal protections for inferior officers from their executive 
branch superiors.138  
Further safeguards against removal, however, can 
undermine the separation of powers and the President’s duty 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”139 In Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Board,140 the 
Supreme Court held that double for-cause removal 
protections—wherein lower-level executive branch officers 
were removable only for cause by superiors who were likewise 
afforded for-cause removal protection—violated Article II of 
the Constitution, and, as a result, the constitutional principle 
of the separation of powers.141 This second layer of removal 
protection, according to the Free Enterprise Fund Court, 
impermissibly insulated agency officials and undermined the 
President’s ability to “oversee the faithfulness of the officers 
who execute” the law, an outcome “contrary to Article II’s 
 
132 U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
133 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 513–14. 
134 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). 
135 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
136 Id. at 629 (upholding for-cause removal constraints for officers of 
“quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies”). 
137 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
138 Id. at 692–93. 
139 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
140 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477 (2010). 
141 Id. at 495–98. 
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vesting of the executive power in the President.”142 Moreover, 
blessing two levels of removal protection, according to the Free 
Enterprise Fund Court, risked permitting congressional 
aggrandizement at the expense of the executive branch by 
subverting “perhaps the key means” of “resist[ing] 
encroachments” by the legislative branch—the President’s 
removal authority.143 
2. Reserve Bank Presidents: An Uneasy 
Constitutional Fit 
Although the Constitution contemplates two sorts of 
officers, this distinction likely does not make a difference in 
assessing the validity of the Federal Reserve Bank 
appointments process under existing law. As Peter Conti-
Brown argues, “it does not matter whether the Reserve Bank 
presidents are considered principal officers or inferior officers; 
their appointment procedure violates the constitutional 
requirements in either context.”144 By vesting the 
appointment authority for Reserve Bank Presidents in the 
Reserve Banks’ boards of directors, rather than in “the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of [a] 
Department[]” (namely, the Board of Governors), the 
appointment process meets neither the standard for principal 
nor inferior officers.145 Although this Appointments Clause 
 
142 Id. at 484. Despite anchoring its analysis on the parties’ stipulation 
that Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) Commissioners 
themselves enjoy for-cause removal protection, see id. at 487, this central 
premise of Free Enterprise Fund is not explicitly commanded by the SEC’s 
governing statute. Id. at 545–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an argument 
that the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s focus on two levels of removal 
protection failed to capture the primary separation of powers problem 
implicated in the case, see Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of 
Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, 
Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2278 (2011) (arguing that 
the nesting of one independent agency (the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board) within another (the SEC) was “virtually unique” among 
administrative agencies). 
143 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 501 (internal citation omitted). 
144 Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 302. 
145 Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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problem spurred a spate of litigation in the D.C. Circuit 
challenging the constitutionality of the FOMC in the 1980s, 
the cases were instead decided on standing grounds or, in 
challenges brought by legislators, on the availability of relief 
through the political process.146  
While the private appointment of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York President is the most constitutionally 
troubling, given the New York Fed President’s permanent 
seat on the FOMC, their role as Vice Chairman of the FOMC, 
and the Bank’s responsibility for the implementation of 
monetary policy,147 the issue extends beyond New York.148 All 
Reserve Bank Presidents are appointed subject to the same 
board-of-directors-initiated process, and each can serve as a 
voting member of the FOMC—a responsibility in which they 
have no overseer.149  
In addition to the constitutional problem associated with 
the private appointment of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, 
the removal protections afforded to the Presidents raises 
 
146 See Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (dismissing based on Riegle); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(dismissing for lack of standing); Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 
873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dismissing legislator complaint based on 
availability of relief through congressional action); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 
461, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (dismissing for lack of standing as either legislator 
or bondholder). See also Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 305–07 (“[L]egal 
doctrines that have nothing to do with the Federal Reserve Act have created 
a kind of hedge around Fed independence that is simultaneously a legal and 
non-legal mechanism.”). 




148 See PETER CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 257–58; Conti-Brown, 
supra note 73, at 301. Conti-Brown also raises the concern that some 
financial institutions, including Wells Fargo and Bank of America, are not 
supervised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and that other banks 
can “move their identity to a more sympathetic Federal Reserve District 
where they could have a say in selecting their regulatory overseer.” CONTI-
BROWN, supra note 13, at 258. 
149 See Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 300–02. 
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further constitutional concerns. Although the Reserve Bank 
Presidents are removable at will by their boards of directors, 
they are removable only for cause by the Board of Governors, 
who are likewise insulated with for-cause protection.150 
Consequently, this arrangement may run afoul of the 
separation of powers boundary demarcated in Free Enterprise 
Fund: two layers of for-cause removal protection, which 
“subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed.”151 Although the authority of the Reserve 
Bank boards of directors, who can remove the Presidents at 
will, may alleviate the Free Enterprise Fund problem 
associated with these layered removal protections, it is likely 
insufficient to remedy the separation of powers concerns 
implicated by the process for removing Reserve Bank 
Presidents—ultimate removal authority is still vested in 
another entity that does not answer to the President.152  
B. The Limitations of the Appointments and Removal 
Framework 
While the appointment and removal procedures for the 
Reserve Bank Presidents, coupled with the decreasing 
importance of the Reserve Banks within the Federal Reserve 
System, may render the Reserve Banks “vestigial” and 
unconstitutional,153 the effects of the Reserve Banks’ 
institutional features are potentially more complicated than 
prior treatment has indicated. As outlined above, challenges 
to the constitutionality of the appointments procedure for 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents were decided without any 
constitutional resolution, creating a “judicial hedge around 
Fed independence.”154 This pattern of dismissing the 
 
150 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 242, 248(f) (2012). 
151 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 498 (2010). See also Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 302–03. 
152 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496 (invalidating an arrangement 
where “[n]either the President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor 
even an officer whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has full 
control over the Board”). 
153 Conti-Brown, supra note 103, at 1, 14. 
154 Conti-Brown, supra note 73, at 305. 
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challenges without resolving the central constitutional issue 
potentially flows from the uneasy fit of monetary policy in 
administrative law. That is, an overarching emphasis on 
independence in central banking has long spurred unusual 
institutional arrangements. Not only was it a preoccupying 
concern of the framers of the National Monetary Commission, 
the precursor of the Federal Reserve, but the First Bank of the 
United States, created in the wake of the founding, similarly 
bore private trappings.155 Indeed, the evasive judicial 
treatment of the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve may 
be a recognition of the historical practice of insulating 
monetary policy from politics and the longstanding rationale 
for doing so.156  
Both  historical practice and persistent concerns over the 
potential for political influence over monetary policy could 
suggest that the quasi-private structure of the Reserve Banks, 
and the role of non-political actors in selecting their 
Presidents, is necessary for independent central banking.157 
The governance structures of other international central 
banks, some of which include private ownership interests, 
indicate that institutional insulation from direct public 
control is not uncommon internationally.158 Although these 
historical and practical justifications for insulation are 
 
155 See NAT’L MONETARY COMM’N, supra note 22, at 14; Walter Dellinger 
& H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney 
General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 117 (1994). 
Dellinger and Powell argue that a modern assessment of the 
constitutionality of the Bank would raise serious concerns under the 
Appointments Clause. Id. at 131–32. The proximity of the Bank Bill to the 
founding could suggest, however, that the framers of the Bank Bill may 
have had an alternative understanding of the applicability of the 
Appointments Clause. 
156 See Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 521–22 
(D.D.C., 1986) aff’d on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(detailing the “subtle and conscious balance of public and private elements” 
that has governed “the regulation of the nation’s monetary systems . . . 
[e]ver since the birth of this nation”). 
157 See supra note 18 at 4–5. 
158 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ISSUES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF 
CENTRAL BANKS 63–65 (2009), https://www.bis.org/publ/othp04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NCG-BQZL]. 
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difficult to reconcile with the aforementioned constitutional 
issues, the proliferation of other government-affiliated 
entities that are not wholly public or private—so-called 
“boundary organizations”—illustrates that the problem 
stretches far beyond the Federal Reserve Banks.159 Like the 
Federal Reserve, a number of other familiar entities exist at 
the public-private boundary, including Amtrak, the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the Federal National 
Mortgage Association.160  
Moreover, the most recent decision to squarely confront the 
delegation of monetary policy authority to Reserve Bank 
Presidents, Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 
upheld the constitutionality of Reserve Bank Presidents 
serving on the FOMC.161 In upholding the validity of the 
FOMC and the exercise of monetary policy authority by 
private citizens, the Melcher court noted the “unusual degree 
of debate and reflection” that led to the “exquisitely balanced 
approach” of the Federal Reserve.162 Finding that the 
separation of powers problems implicated by other 
congressional attempts to insulate executive branch officers 
from Presidential control—namely, legislative 
aggrandizement at the expense of the executive branch—were 
absent when Congress (and the President) voluntarily 
devolved public power on private citizen Reserve Bank 
Presidents, the Melcher court viewed the Appointments 
Clause as permitting a regime where the appointment of 
would-be principal officers occurred entirely outside the 
political branches.163 The Melcher court cautioned that its 
 
159 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 841 (2014), for an account of quasi-governmental entities that 
exist at the “boundaries” of the federal government. O’Connell notes that 
such “boundary organizations” raise a host of legal classification questions, 
including the application of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 902–06. 
160 Id. at 856–61. 
161 Melcher, 644 F. Supp. at 523–24. See Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The 
Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power 
with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 133–37 (1989) for the opposite 
view. 
162 Id. at 524. 
163 Id. at 520–22. 
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reasoning was “necessarily narrow,” and that the “history of 
private participation” in monetary policy “may well make a 
significant difference in terms of any attempted delegation” in 
another sphere of governmental authority.164  On appeal, the 
D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case, 
but avoided ruling on the merits of the Appointments Clause 
challenge by citing the “insurmountable barrier” of equitable 
discretion and the fact that the congressman who had brought 
the suit “could obtain substantial relief from his fellow 
legislators” through the legislative process.165  
While the Melcher court thus found the tension between 
the Appointments Clause and the quasi-private Reserve 
Banks reconcilable, the possibility that such a holding would 
recur today, more than three decades later, is likely slim. The 
Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit’s recent treatment of another 
quasi-governmental “boundary organization,” Amtrak, 
demonstrates the application of constitutional standards to 
other government-created private entities. In Department of 
Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, the Supreme 
Court held that Amtrak was a governmental entity for the 
purposes of the nondelegation doctrine.166 In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Alito questioned the validity of the process for 
appointing both the arbitrator tasked with resolving 
regulatory disagreements between Amtrak and the Federal 
Railroad Administration and Amtrak’s President.167 On 
remand, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the appointment 
procedure for the arbitrator tasked with resolving 
performance metrics and standards disputes between Amtrak 
and the Federal Railroad Administration, as the arbitrator 
 
164 Id. at 523. 
165 Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (citing Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
166 Dep’t of Transp. v. Assoc. of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233 (2015). 
167 Id. at 1236–40 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito argued that the 
non-Presidentially appointed arbitrator, if a public official, “would be 
making law without supervision”—and “an officer without a supervisor 
must be principal.” Id. at 1238. Justice Alito further contended that the 
appointment procedure for Amtrak’s president met neither the standard for 
principal nor inferior officers. Id. at 1239–40. 
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was not directed or supervised by a Senate-confirmed 
principal officer.168  
Thus, in recent cases where the appointment process for 
other quasi-governmental entity officials faced judicial 
scrutiny, both the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have 
proven willing to apply constitutional requirements to such 
“boundary organizations.” As a result, given the doctrinally 
tenuous status of the Reserve Banks, examining whether 
their organizational structure privileges private interests is 
necessary. Should the makeup of the Reserve Bank Presidents 
indeed reflect undue influence of industry, remedying the 
constitutional shortcomings of their appointments procedure 
would be even more pressing. This Note thus concludes by 
examining the central critique lobbed at the Reserve Banks: 
that their institutional arrangement increases the risk of 
private industry capture by involving private citizens in the 
selection of their Presidents.   
V. AGAINST THE GRAIN: THE RESULTS OF 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK APPOINTMENTS 
A. Reserve Bank Presidential Appointments in 
Practice  
Although the constitutional issues raised by Reserve Bank 
Presidential appointments and removal are consequential, 
the link between them and the potential for undue influence 
by financial interests is less clear. Most notably, for a process 
criticized as beholden to private interests—the interests of 
regulated entities, no less—recent Reserve Bank 
appointments have almost overwhelmingly been drawn not 
from finance or the private sector more generally, but from 
within the Federal Reserve itself.  
Indeed, only two current Reserve Bank Presidents are 
veterans of the financial industry: Robert Kaplan, President 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Neel Kashkari, 
 
168 Assoc. of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 39 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
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President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.169 
Nearly all of the remaining Reserve Bank Presidents, by 
contrast, were former Federal Reserve employees prior to 
assuming their post as President.170 Some Presidents, 
including John Williams, whose appointment spurred the 
public consternation outlined in the Introduction, have spent 
 
169 Both had previously worked at Goldman Sachs. See Robert S. 
Kaplan, FED. RES. BANK DALLAS, 
https://www.dallasfed.org/fed/bios/kaplan.aspx [https://perma.cc/8UNH-
T823] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019); President Neel Kashkari, FED. RES. BANK 
MINNEAPOLIS, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/about/president 
[https://perma.cc/J8LH-RRRS] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019). 
170 See Raphael Bostic: President and Chief Executive Officer, FED. RES. 
BANK ATLANTA (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/about/atlantafed/officers/executive_office/bostic
-raphael.aspx [https://perma.cc/2D5P-TQRC]; Office of the President, FED. 
RES. BANK BOSTON, https://www.bostonfed.org/people/bank/eric-
rosengren.aspx [https://perma.cc/R6NM-AX62] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019); 
Charles Evans: President and Chief Executive Officer, FED. RES. BANK 
CHICAGO, https://www.chicagofed.org/people/e/evans-charles 
[https://perma.cc/CG2H-T2JG] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019); Loretta J. 
Mester: President and Chief Executive Officer, FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND 
(2019), https://www.clevelandfed.org/people-search?pid=51d503bc-e964-
4f3a-b26e-5c472e868348 [https://perma.cc/8UHW-NGVB]; President Esther 
L. George, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY, 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/esthergeorge [https://perma.cc/D5GU-
MMUE] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019); Office of the President, FED. RES. BANK 
N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/orgchart/Williams 
[https://perma.cc/Y2Y2-ELF6] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019); Our District: 
Leadership, FED. RES. BANK S.F. (Oct. 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/our-
district/leadership/office-of-the-president/ [https://perma.cc/FN4Y-YP29]; 
James Bullard, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/bullard/vita/bullard_vita.pdf?
la=en [https://perma.cc/Y2CE-ZS6W] (June 22, 2019). The two remaining 
Presidents who are neither financial industry nor Federal Reserve System 
veterans have spent their careers in higher education and consulting. ‘See 
Executive Leadership: Patrick T. Harker, President and Chief Executive 
Officer, FED. RES. BANK PHILADELPHIA, 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/about-the-fed/senior-executives/harker 
[https://perma.cc/VQW8-FGCH] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019); Our Leadership 
& Governance: Thomas I. Barkin, FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND, 
https://www.richmondfed.org/about_us/our_leadership_governance/preside
nt_2 [https://perma.cc/QNT9-JF6T] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
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their entire career in the Federal Reserve System.171 Although 
Williams was characterized as a “consummate central-bank 
insider” after assuming the New York Fed post,172 six other 
Presidents had similarly spent the majority of their careers 
within the Federal Reserve before assuming the President 
post.173 And this trend is not limited to the current slate of 
Reserve Bank Presidents—the majority of the preceding 
generation of Reserve Bank Presidents, nearly all of whom 
were appointed prior to Dodd-Frank’s elimination of Class A 
voting interests, were Federal Reserve System veterans as 
well.174  
 




172 Timiraos, supra note 5. 
173 See Office of the President, supra note 170; Charles Evans: President 
and Chief Executive Officer, supra note 170; Loretta J. Mester: President and 
Chief Executive Officer, supra note 170; President Esther L. George, supra 
note 170; Office of the President, supra note 170; Our District: Leadership, 
supra note 170; James Bullard, supra note 170. 
174 See Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Cathy E. Minehan, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/cathy_e_minehan 
[https://perma.cc/677Y-24MX] (Boston, 1994–2007); Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland, Sandra Pianalto, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/sandra_pianalto 
[https://perma.cc/QAX9-CWT8] (Cleveland, 2003–14); Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, Thomas M. Hoenig, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/thomas_m_hoenig 
[https://perma.cc/CCZ6-EJUH] (Kansas City, 1991–2011); Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, Naryana Kocherlakota, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/narayana_kocherlakota 
[https://perma.cc/CLE8-QTEU] (Minneapolis, 2009–15); Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Richmond, Jeffrey M. Lacker, FED. RES. HIST.,  
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/jeffrey_m_lacker 
[https://perma.cc/5WX6-ZVS8] (Richmond, 2004–17); Fed. Reserve Bank of 
S.F., John C. Williams, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/john_c_williams 
[https://perma.cc/3KV2-ZKC2] (San Francisco, 2011–18); Fed. Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, William Poole, FED. RES. HIST., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/william_poole 
[https://perma.cc/3C59-8AW5] (St. Louis, 1998–2008). William Dudley, New 
York Fed President prior to Williams, worked at the New York Fed 
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Furthermore, the process for appointing Federal Reserve 
Bank Presidents has shifted away from any direct 
involvement of regulated entities. Both the statutory 
elimination of Class A directors’ roles in selecting Reserve 
Bank Presidents175 and Reserve Bank-specific bylaws 
prohibiting the involvement of thrift institutions in the 
process have effectively eliminated the direct influence of 
regulated entities in selecting Reserve Bank Presidents. 
Moreover, although the selection of Reserve Bank Presidents 
is not formally vested in the Chair of the Federal Reserve 
System or in the Board of Governors, the Board’s apparent 
role in recent appointments has been widely noted. The 
appointment of John Williams, a member of Federal Reserve 
Chair Jerome Powell’s “inner circle,” is illustrative of the 
potentially influential role of the Chair in selecting future 
FOMC colleagues, particularly those with the most 
consequential voices among Reserve Bank Presidents.176 
Thus, the makeup of Reserve Bank Presidents seemingly 
cuts against any contention that the results of the process 
would be appreciably different under a regime where a 
different, public entity selects Reserve Bank Presidents. The 
prevalence of Federal Reserve System veterans serving as 
Presidents assuages concerns that banks can “seek[] more 
sympathetic regulatory treatment by changing their seat of 
incorporation out of New York and into another district.”177 As 
a result, although the role of the board of directors in 
appointments may continue to pose accountability 
 
immediately before assuming the Presidency, but spent the majority of his 
prior career at Goldman Sachs. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., William C. 




175 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2012). Of course, regulated institutions continue to 
play an indirect role, as they select any eligible Class B directors who are 
not affiliated with thrift institutions. 
176 See Smialek et al., supra note 6; Smialek & Boesler, supra note 8 
(“Some Fed watchers question how much influence Powell has exerted and 
whether that’s biased the New York selection process toward an insider.”). 
177 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 258. 
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problems,178 it is unclear that vesting the appointment power 
in a public actor would necessarily alter the result of the 
current appointment regime—the elevation of Federal 
Reserve System veterans, including some who have spent the 
bulk of their careers at one Reserve Bank, to the President 
post.179 Indeed, the practice and results of recent 
appointments may resemble—at least informally—Peter 
Conti-Brown’s suggested alteration to the appointments 
procedure of Reserve Bank Presidents: placing the power of 
appointment and removal in the Board of Governors, 
“essentially turn[ing] [the Federal Reserve Banks] into 
branch offices of the Federal Reserve in the twelve cities 
where they are located.”180 
Of course, these practical consequences do little to 
eliminate the doctrinal shortcomings of the process for 
appointing and removing Federal Reserve Bank Presidents.181 
But functionally, they illustrate the potentially benign results 
of that arrangement. Insulation from presidential control has 
not undermined the “quality of appointments,” despite the 
potential for “interest-group pressure” at the Reserve 
Banks.182 As a result, the consequence of the constitutional 
shortcomings of Reserve Bank governance is far less 
problematic in practice.  
 
178 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 119. 
179 See, e.g., President Esther L. George, supra note 170; Office of the 
President, supra note 170. 
180 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 258. To solve the constitutional 
deficiencies associated with the two-layer removal protections for the 
Reserve Bank Presidents, the current for-cause restrictions on Reserve 
Bank President removal by the Board of Governors would have to be 
eliminated. Id. at 255–56. Conti-Brown also advocates, as a “natural 
extension” of vesting the appointment and removal power of Reserve Bank 
Presidents in the Board of Governors, removing Presidents from the FOMC, 
including the permanent position of the New York Fed President as Vice 
Chair of the FOMC. Id. at 258–59. Such an arrangement would remove the 
last instance in which Reserve Bank Presidents exercise unsupervised 
policy discretion, thereby eliminating the constitutional problems currently 
implicated by their presence on the FOMC. 
181 See supra Section IV.A. 
182 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). 
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B. Remedying the Appointment Process for Greater 
Transparency and Accountability 
Thus, an alternative conception of how to remedy the 
appointments process of Reserve Bank Presidents is 
necessary. Given the potential involvement of the Board of 
Governors in selecting Presidents and the pattern of 
promoting Reserve System insiders, some of the concerns 
associated with the role of Reserve Bank boards of directors 
appear to be unfounded. This homogeneity of Reserve Bank 
Presidents, however, raises other important issues.  
After the appointment of New York Fed President John 
Williams, some criticized the selection of an insider as 
furthering the trend toward homogeneity within Federal 
Reserve.183 The New York Fed recently faced criticism that its 
organizational culture was “marked by insufficient individual 
initiative”184 and “ruled by groupthink.”185 After the financial 
crisis, some pointed to the insularity of the Federal Reserve 
as a potentially exacerbating cause.186 Looking beyond the 
regulatory sphere, the lack of dissenting votes on the FOMC 
may further indicate homogeneity within the System.187 To 
the extent that the politically insulated process for appointing 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents  further entrenches this 
trend, the practical effects on regulation may be undesirable. 
Additionally, the dominance of monetary policy experience 
among Federal Reserve Bank Presidents may be ill-suited to 
 
183 See Casselman, supra note 6 (“The problem with picking a longtime 
Fed insider is it just amplifies the risk of groupthink . . . [which] has proven 
to be a very serious threat at the Fed.”). 
184 See FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., supra note 13, at 3. 
185  Inside the New York Fed, supra note 12. 
186 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 109, at 103 (recounting the 
triumph of the “Greenspan doctrine” over external calls to reconsider the 
connection between deregulation, innovation, and economic risk). After the 
appointment of John Williams, some raised similar concerns. See 
Casselman, supra note 6 (“[T]here are also risks to picking an insider. Fed 
officials failed to appreciate the risks posed by the housing bubble in the 
mid-2000s, for example, even as some outside voices tried to raise the 
alarm.”). 
187 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 121–22. 
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achieve the goal of effective financial supervision. For 
example, the appointment of John Williams raised some 
concern that Williams lacked the financial experience 
commensurate to the task of supervising the banks in the New 
York Fed’s district.188 More generally, economists dominate 
among Reserve Bank Presidents, undermining any contention 
that “the current governance structure produces a valuable 
range of intellectual diversity.”189 This further illustrates the 
problems associated with combining monetary and 
supervisory responsibility within the Federal Reserve.  
Trends toward centralization in the appointments process 
may only serve to exacerbate these problems. Although the 
potential involvement of Federal Reserve Chair Powell in the 
recent selection of the New York Fed President may mitigate 
accountability concerns raised by the pronounced involvement 
of regional boards of directors, it resulted in the elevation of a 
member of the Chair’s “inner circle” to “build[] out the 
leadership team for a new Federal Reserve chairman who isn’t 
an economist.”190 And because of the opacity of the Reserve 
Bank President appointment process, the public received 
scant information regarding the actual criteria of selection or 
the relative influence of the Board of Governors, the Reserve 
Banks’ boards of directors, or other involved parties in the 
appointment process.  
Thus, although greater involvement of the Board of 
Governors in the selection of Reserve Bank Presidents may 
alleviate concerns about industry capture, the selection of 
another Federal Reserve insider to a Reserve Bank 
Presidency points to a different problem in Reserve Bank 
 
188 See Heather Long, John Williams Tapped to Lead New York Fed, 
Frustrating Progressives and Worrying Some on Wall Street, WASH. POST 




(“Some on Wall Street are also concerned that Williams, a Stanford 
economist who has spent most of his career at the central bank, does not 
have enough experience with markets.”). 
189 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 261. 
190 See Timiraos, supra note 5. 
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governance and demands an alternative solution. Without 
more systemic transparency in the selection process, efforts at 
public engagement, including the New York Fed’s recent 
attempt to “emphasize[] an unusual amount of transparency” 
in their selection process,191 may do little to counter public 
dissatisfaction over the legitimacy of the appointment process 
and insularity of the selection.192 Legislative changes 
suggested after the most recent New York Fed appointment 
included requiring the New York Fed President to testify 
before Congress and making the New York Fed President a 
Presidential appointment.193 More ambitious and far-reaching 
reforms remain possible (if unlikely), ranging from formally 
vesting appointment and at-will removal power in the Board 
of Governors, to stripping the Reserve Banks of their private 
status entirely.194  
The longstanding historical foundations of the quasi-
private Federal Reserve and the failure of similarly ambitious 
bills following the financial crisis, however, suggest that 
systemic reforms aimed at Federal Reserve Bank governance 
are unlikely. Instead, reforms adopted by the Reserve Banks 
themselves are likely the more promising avenue for change. 
The New York Fed’s recent commitment to transparency, 
though ultimately leaving many unsatisfied, provides a 
roadmap for future reforms that could be adopted and 
expanded throughout the Federal Reserve System.  
First, the identification of consulted “stakeholders” in the 
Presidential search process would better illuminate the 
relative influence of Reserve Bank boards of directors and the 
Board of Governors, and clarify the role of the Board of 
 
191 See Smialek & Boesler, supra note 8. 
192 See Timiraos, supra note 5 (“Those frustrations amplified objections 
over a search process that happens out of  public view . . . ‘[s]uch an opaque 
process harms the Fed’s legitimacy and undermines its credibility and 
effectiveness in serving the public . . . .’”). 
193 See Smialek & Boesler, supra note 8. 
194 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 13, at 258; Binyamin Applebaum, 
Two Federal Reserve Openings Provide One Chance to Counter Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/federal-reserve-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/8RS4-XURA]. 
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Governors in selecting Reserve Bank Presidents.195 As argued 
above, the opacity of Reserve Bank governance does not 
necessarily privilege financial interests, but it can instead 
mask involvement by the Board of Governors. Formal 
identification of consulted parties in the search process, as 
well as information on the frequency and timing of 
consultation (particularly with the Board of Governors), 
would promote greater transparency in appointments.  
Second, allowing a formal window for public input, and 
actively soliciting public involvement within that time period, 
would allow for greater and more focused participation in the 
search process. The New York Fed, for example, solicited only 
generalized feedback about the search process online by 
requesting public nominations for potential candidates and 
allowing for the opportunity for general feedback via email.196 
Although the lack of general transparency surrounding the 
most recent New York Fed President selection makes any 
effort to discern the impact of public participation difficult, it 
is unlikely that these minimal measures provided sufficient 
avenues for public engagement in the search process. While 
some limitations on public feedback are likely necessary to 
preserve an efficient process, a greater commitment to 
meaningful public comment would serve to both heighten 
transparency in the appointments procedure and ensure that 
public participation can be focused towards specific nominees 
being seriously considered for the role. 
Finally, identification of candidates prior to a final 
selection would further serve to elicit more fruitful public 
comment during the process, rather than limiting 
involvement to post-hoc criticism. To the extent that identified 
candidates remain veterans of the Federal Reserve System, 
 
195 See Presidential Search Frequently Asked Questions, FED. RES. 
BANK N.Y.  
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/aboutthefed/presidential-
search/faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL67-EMP8] (identifying consulted 
stakeholders as “representatives from academia, community and economic 
development organizations, not-for-profits, industry, small businesses, 
minority and women-owned businesses, manufacturing and labor”). 
196 Presidential Search Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 198. 
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public identification would provide an adequate opportunity 
for criticism at a time when it could prove most effective. 
Moreover, such identification would also serve to increase 
communications from Reserve Banks throughout the selection 
process, offering more meaningful transparency prior to an 
appointment. A greater commitment to procedural 
transparency could satisfy public opinion about the ultimate 
selection, no matter the result. 
Of course, the aforementioned solutions do not guarantee 
that future selections will buck the trend of appointing 
Federal Reserve System veterans. As previously argued, 
however, the appointment of insiders is less worrisome than 
fears of financial industry influence in Reserve Bank 
governance.197 Transparency reforms thus may not serve to 
change the ultimate results of the process, but could 
demonstrate to the public that, in the words of a former 
Federal Reserve Bank President, future search committees 
and boards of directors “looked sufficiently outside the realm 
of people they know” and fully accounted for public input, even 
if the process ultimately “le[d] them back to a Fed insider.”198 
Additionally, a greater commitment to public participation in 
the appointments process could buttress the Federal 
Reserve’s legitimacy in the subsequent exercise of its 
supervisory and monetary policy functions—responsibilities 
which, as argued above, require some opacity and insulation 
from the public eye. 
More drastic solutions advanced by those wary of the role 
of financial interests in Reserve Bank governance fail to 
account for the practical results of Reserve Bank 
appointments and the feasibility of large-scale reform. 
Recognizing the actual nature of the process instead indicates 
that any future solutions should be framed around a 
commitment to achieve greater procedural transparency and 
increased public input. Although more comprehensive 
legislative reforms aimed at the Reserve Banks remain 
possible—and, in light of the aforementioned constitutional 
 
197 See supra Section V.A. 
198 Smialek & Boesler, supra note 8. 
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infirmities of the Reserve Banks, worthwhile—a sustained 
commitment to transparency could answer many of the 
recurring concerns in the Reserve Bank President selection 
process.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 There is no question that the Federal Reserve Banks are 
an anomaly within the federal government. Given the unusual 
features of their governance structure and the role that 
private interests—including, until recently, financial 
interests—play in the selection of their Presidents, it is 
unsurprising that their existence has sparked concerns about 
the influence of regulated entities in financial supervision and 
the constitutional shortcomings of the Reserve Banks’ 
institutional design. The practice of Federal Reserve Bank 
President appointments, however, has recently been marked 
by the involvement of Presidential appointees and widespread 
elevation of Federal Reserve staff to President posts. As a 
result, any reforms aimed at the appointment process for 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents should account for the 
current reality of the process, which differs markedly from the 
popular account that the selection process privileges financial 
interests.   
